This paper examines self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in an open economy environment. Using an extended model of Barrett (1994), we show that: (i) equilibrium tariff is positive; (ii) the endogenously determined size and the effectiveness of an multilateral IEA are the tradeoff of four effects, i.e. entry effect, level effect, leakage effect, and tariff effect. The paper also offers an alternative explanation for the minimum participation clause adopted by most IEAs that is consistent with the mandate of an IEA.
Introduction
One of the biggest and most urgent environmental problems is global warming, brought about by human activities with greenhouse gas (GHG) emission. The global atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as CO 2 increased by 30 percent during the past 200 years. As the consequence, the Earth has warmed by 0.6 0 C over the past 100 years. Such changes have not only caused damage to the humanbuilt infrastructure because of the rising sea level, but also reduced productivity, and increased life hazards, etc. As the atmosphere is a global public good, its management requires multilateral endeavor across all nations through international environmental agreements (IEAs) such as the Kyoto Protocol that was ratified by participating nations in 1997.
Cooperation in international environmental issues differs from most other international problems (Barrett (2005) ). For instance, in free trade agreements (FTAs), 1 The 1990s saw a rapid proliferation of literature on the effect of international trade on global environment. There is no consensus that whether trade in general is detrimental or beneficial to the environment. A group of researchers believe that free trade is not the cause of environmental problems, instead, the impetus of environment protection because free trade will promote optimal resource allocation globally (Anderson and Blackhurst (1992) , Cole et al (1998) ). Trade will induce more resources devoted to clean production and abatement, and freer trade eliminates the distortionary trade policies which are generally bad for the environment (Torres (1999) ). Based on the study of NAFTA, Grossman and Krueger (1993) categorize the impact of trade on the environment into three effects, namely, composite effect, scale effect, and technique effect, and conclude that gains from NAFTA should drive Mexico towards stricter climate policies. However, there is no consensus that trade will in general promote environment. For instance, Dean (1992) , a literature survey on trade and environment, has flavored that trade is bad for environment. Copeland and Taylor (1995) , using a general equilibrium model, find that if countries differ significantly in income level, free trade will raise world pollution. Beghin et al (1995) were then able to show that the scale effect dominated the composite effect in Mexico's accession to NAFTA and consequently pollution became worse.
Despite the importance of the problem, the relevant literature of IEA and trade is disproportionately small. One exception is Barrett (1997) , in which a framework that incorporates both the environmental damages and abatement costs in an IEA formation problem with free trade is provided; the paper then illustrates how trade sanctions can help to support IEA cooperation 2 . It is plausible that higher participation can realize under free trade though total abatement is less. The leakage effect, contrary to the common wisdom, can be positive in terms of promoting greater participation when damage cost is high.
Questions regarding the relationship between tariff-ridden trade and IEA formation without credible sanction threat, both in terms of participation and total abatement, Baomin Dong and Xin Zhao Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 16 (2009) 339-356 341 have remained unanswered. The current paper addresses these issues. In this paper, the impact of trade is decomposed into entry, level, leakage, and tariff effects. We show that for a given size of an IEA, the entry and tariff effects are positive on total abatement, and level and leakage effects are negative on total abatement. Therefore the total effect of trade on IEA is contingent on the magnitude of the four effects. When entry and tariff effects dominate leakage and level effects, trade is good for IEA in the sense that greater global abatement level and/or a larger IEA will realize. Furthermore, the equilibrium tariff level is shown to be positive, and the introduction of tariff improves the trade-off between the size and effectiveness of an IEA.
One interesting observation is that in most IEAs, there is a minimum participation clause stating that if the number of signatories is below some certain threshold, the IEA becomes void. This is in contrast with other international problems such as FTA where agreements can be formed through a bilateral process. The current paper finds that a minimum participation clause is necessary because if there are too few signatories, then optimal abatement levels of signatories will be lower than that of non-signatories, which is in contradiction of the mandate of the IEA and therefore any meaningful IEA that fails to meet minimum participation constraint may not be self-enforcing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, the model is set up; Section 3 focuses on the analysis of the IEA under autarky; Section 4 analyzes the impact of trade on the IEA; Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
Model Setup
There are N ex ante symmetric countries; 3 each of which has one firm producing a homogenous good with pollution as a byproduct. Denote by k the number of signatories of the IEA (hence (N -k)is the number of nonsignatories). Denote by y a country's abatement level and let y si (k), y nj (k) be respectively the abatement levels of signatory i and nonsignatory j (subscripts s and n stand for signatory and nonsignatory respectively) when there are k signatories. The benefit function of a country from emission abatement is B(∑ l y l ), l = 1...N, B' > 0, which captures the nature of (perfectly dispersed) transboundary pollution as a public bad The complete order of plays in this model is as follows: • date 1: countries determine whether to join in the IEA or not; • date 2: signatories determine their abatement levels collectively (signatories as Stackelberg leaders); • date 3: nonsignatories set their abatement levels independently; • date 4: under autarky, domestic firms produce goods and sell them; under trade, countries set their optimal tariffs; • date 5: under trade, firms compete in both domestic and international markets, facing the tariffs of trade partners.
The Autarky Benchmark
Assume that firms bear all the abatement cost and receive no subsidy from the governments which make decisions on the abatement levels. The objective function of the (monopolistic) firm in country i under autarky is The FOCs for the objective functions of nonsignatories and signatories are respectively 
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Inequality (5) implies that although nonsignatories react negatively to signatories' abatement, the amount of abatement decreased by all nonsignatories does not offset the signatories' abatement at margin.
The following proposition offers an alternative explanation for the minimum participation clause of an IEA.
Proposition 1 The minimum participation clause is the necessary condition for a signatory of an IEA to abate more emission than a nonsignatory, when C"
When C" D -α > 0, the second term on RHS of (6) is increasing in abatement level y i . Therefore, if a signatory is required to abate more than a nonsignatory, say y s > y n , then the LHS of (6) must be positive. Because B' > 0, hence it suffices to show that
monotonically increasing with k. It is then straightforward that only if the size of IEA is above the threshold value k
, the minimum participation level, can there be y s > y n . Black, Levi, and de Meza (1993) point out that the existence of minimum participation rule is due to incomplete information, and the purpose of the rule is to maximize the expected global surplus. Carraro, Marchiori, and Oreffice (2003) conclude that before countries make decisions whether to sign an IEA, the existence of a minimum participation clause maximizes their ex post payoff. By contrast, we argue that the purpose of a minimum participation clause is that it serves as an instrument to fulfill the mandate of an IEA.
Participation is one of the most important problems in an IEA. Define the incentive function of participating in an IEA under the autarky scenario as,
Equation (7) 
IEA under Trade
This section considers IEA formation in the open economy case. It can be proven that the optimal tariff of a country under MFN treatment is positive, resulting in a tariffridden trade equilibrium. We then decompose the impact of trade on the IEA into four effects, namely entry effect, level effect, leakage effect, and tariff effect. The overall impact of trade on IEA's effectiveness is ambiguous, as the four effects countervail each other. Two examples are given to illustrate when trade is beneficial and detrimental to IEA.
Upon opening up to foreign competition, firms from all other countries enter the market to compete for profits. In any country i, the FOCs of profit functions of all the firms competing in this market are respectively,
. . .
P(Q
where Q T i is the total consumption in country i under trade, q j i is the export of firm i to country j, and superscript T stands for trade.
The welfare maximization problem for country i is
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Equilibrium tariff level is obtained straightforwardly as
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, the tariff of a country under MFN treatment to all other countries is positive.
Proof. Adding up all firms' FOCs and differentiating yields
By SOC, we have (N + 1)P'(Q
as country i increases its tariff, the total quantity sold in its market decreases. This is because the higher trade barrier reduces competition. Differentiating the FOC of firm i in (8) w.r.t. T i yields,
Equation (12) implies that given 
Based on (13), the numerator of (10) can be then simplified to
By SOC of profit function and(10) , it is easy to verify that P Q i
1, hence the numerator of (11) 
Therefore, the optimal tariff of country i is positive. The discussion of the impact of trade on IEA in Barrett (1997) is based on free trade. In this paper, it is established that tariffs are positive. When a country decides whether to impose a positive tariff, it faces a trade-off, i.e. to set a positive tariff, the consumer surplus is hurt due to increased price, while the local government receives tariff revenue and the local firm enjoys higher profit. In this model, the equilibrium price is not strongly affected by a tariff
1 , so consumer surplus loss is more than offset by tariff revenue. As a result, the countries impose a positive tariff to increase social welfare. The next subsection proves that the existence of a positive tariff is beneficial for global abatement, as it goes against the negative effects of trade on IEA. Markusen (1975) claims that domestic environmental policy can be decomposed into three effects: the marginal environmental damage effect, terms-of-trade effect, and leakage effect. A more frequently used categorization is Grossman and Krueger (1991)'s decomposition: the composition effect, scale effect, and technique effect. However, because technique effect is somewhat vague in static models, it makes the total effect ambiguous. 5 In the current paper, we propose the following decomposition: 
The Impact of Trade on IEA: A Decomposition
•
Entry Effect
The entry effect is the basis of the other three effects. To study its impact on IEA, one needs to single out the entry effect.
• No level effect: firms do not increase their outputs in every market (i.e. country i keeps its output in any other country j 's market at q j i ) ;
• No leakage effect: the production of a firm is not affected by other countries' abatement level; • No tariff effect: a country's tariff will not be affected by its own abatement level, and will not affect any countries' production in its market (equivalent to a zero tariff). Thus, under the entry effect, the firm i sells equal amounts of its production in every market, that is, 
When the entry effect is present ( TE denotes the case that entry effect is present alone), the FOCs of nonsignatories' and signatories' objective functions can be respectively written as, 
Level Effect
The level effect refers to the case where firms increase their output in every market due to increased competition to 
Proposition 4 Given a fixed size of the IEA, the level effect is detrimental to global abatement, or the absolute effectiveness of the IEA.
The proof is provided in Appendix A. Accounting & Economics 16 (2009) 339-356 349 
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Leakage Effect
The leakage effect refers to the fact that emission sources migrate from abating to non-abating countries. Typically, the leakage effect weakens the collective abatement effort of signatories in an IEA. However, if the leakage effect is strong, such that signatories have to abate more collectively to (partially) offset the leakage, then the leakage effect may serve as a tool to better aligning countries' incentive to join an IEA. This view points out a potential positive role that the leakage effect may play in an IEA formation.
Define the leakage effect as Accounting & Economics 16 (2009) 339-356 350 The proof of Proposition 5 is given in Appendix B. Although leakage may be beneficial in terms of participation, we argue that it is always detrimental to absolute effectiveness. The leakage effect disadvantages signatories in competition, and thus reduces the abatement of signatories. As a result, the level of signatories' abatement decreases. As the signatories emit more, nonsignatories increase their abatement, as their marginal benefit of abatement is increased. The decrease of signatories' abatement outweighs the increase of nonsignatories' abatement in this model, so overall emission increases, compared to the case when the leakage effect is absent.
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Tariff Effect
In this model, the tariff levels of all countries are endogenously determined. Signatories do not cooperate in setting tariffs, i.e. a signatory sets a tariff to maximize its own welfare therefore tariff does not serve as sanction tool to enforce higher abatement and/or larger participation.
6 Since this is a static model, commercial reprisals threats or trade sanctions are not considered. Countries set tariffs following MFN treatment, that is, a country sets a uniform tariff to all other countries. Tariff setting in the current paper is noncooperative and nondiscriminative according to WTO rules. One may consider alternative situations where tariffs are set cooperatively (within the IEA signatories) and/or with common tariff against external countries. However, a more appropriate analog to realistic greenhouse gas emission IEA negotiations is the noncooperative tariff framework used in the current model.
The effect of tariffs on an IEA is twofold: (i) the tariff of a country will reduce foreign firms' competitiveness in its market, thus lessening market competition; (ii) the tariff is the very force that can help a country to deal with competitive disadvantage induced by the country's increased abatement level. Therefore, the tariff effect goes in the opposition directions of the level effect and the leakage effect, both of which are detrimental to the absolute effectiveness of an IEA. Thus, without an algebraic proof, we can conclude that the tariff effect is beneficial for an IEA's effectiveness.
Equilibrium and Simulation
Similar to the autarky benchmark, when trade is present, the incentive function of participation, or external stability condition of the IEA can be written as
where l T (k), k * T , and k T are similarly defined. The absolute effectiveness of an IEA when trade is present is then N k T yn k T ys -+ . The two specific examples used for simulation are still the ones adopted in Section 3: example 1 contains B(∑ l y l ) = ∑ l y l , C D (y i ) = 1 2 y i 2 , P(Q i ) = 1 -Q i and marginal production cost C M (y i ) = 0.005 + 0.001y i ; in example 2, the benefit function, direct marginal cost, and marginal production cost are the same as in example 1, except the demand function is different, i.e. P(Q i ) 1 -100Q i . Figure 1 depicts the relationship between equilibrium participation and N. In example 1, the equilibrium IEA size is 2. In example 2, when N is not large, the participation equilibrium of IEA is 3, otherwise it is 2. Example 2 implies that under some circumstances trade may be helpful in increasing countries' incentive to participate an IEA. In both autarky and tariff-ridden trade, the incentive function of participation includes two parts: the benefit of becoming a signatory, and the cost of participating in the IEA, which is constituted by the increase of direct abatement cost and the reduced social welfare in response to changes in consumption, profit, and tariff revenue. In example 1, after countries open up to trade, the cost of participation is larger than its benefit, therefore the size of the IEA is smaller than that under autarky. In example 2, because market size is smaller compared with example 1 (in example 1, Q i (P i ) = 1 -P i , and in example 2, Q i (P i ) = 1 Pi 100 ), the cost of participation is lower when the total number of countries is in a medium range; therefore the size of the IEA is larger than that under autarky. The implication of the contrasting results is that whether freer trade facilitates or hinders self-enforcing IEA depends on market size. The intuition is that, when market size is small, gain from the not participating IEA is small because the weight of environment in social welfare is relatively high.
One of our concerns is whether the IEA under trade entail higher abatement than under autarky. Figure 2 provides an illustrative answer.
Baomin Dong and Xin Zhao Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 16 (2009) [339] [340] [341] [342] [343] [344] [345] [346] [347] [348] [349] [350] [351] [352] [353] [354] [355] [356] Figure 2 implies that, in example 1, the absolute effectiveness under autarky is always larger than that under trade, and the difference between them is increasing in the total number of countries. This result indicates that in Example 1, the level effect and leakage effect dominate the entry and tariff effects. Yet, we argue that this is not always the case. In Example 2, when N is between 12 and 26, the absolute effectiveness of an IEA is larger under trade; this may be due to the fact that entry and tariff effects are stronger than level and leakage effects.
Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the impact of trade on the formation (equilibrium participation) and effectiveness (global abatement level) of an IEA. Emission of the pollutant is associated with production rather than consumption. Households benefit from consumption as well as a cleaner environment. The pollution is perfectly transboundary; therefore, every country is equally adversely affected by total emission. Therefore, collective actions, via international environmental agreements, are required to achieve the optimum.
In the autarky benchmark, we provide an alternative explanation of the minimum participation clause adopted by most IEAs, i.e. unless the size of an IEA reaches some minimum participation level, signatories strategically abate less than that of the nonsignatories, which is in contradiction to the mandate of an IEA.
The second finding of the paper is the positive tariff in equilibrium. In Barrett (1997) , free trade is assumed in a sanction model of IEA; however, it is proven in the current paper that an equilibrium tariff is positive, when most-favored nation treatment (MFN) is adopted.
The existing papers in IEA literature are generally pessimistic. The current paper is no exception in that full participation can not be implemented through a self-enforcing IEA with trade. However, international trade may not necessarily worsen the overall trade-off and outcome.
Baomin Dong and Xin Zhao Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 16 (2009) 339-356 353 Although the overall impact of trade on IEA is hard to evaluate, the decomposition proposed by this paper can be helpful. Conceptually, the total effect can be decomposed into four effects, i.e. entry effect, level effect, leakage effect, and tariff effect. The monotonicity of each effect on equilibrium global abatement level is proven. In particular, given that the number of IEA signatories is fixed, the global abatement level increases in the entry and tariff effects, and decreases in the level and leakage effects. The overall impact of trade on the effectiveness of an IEA depends on the relative magnitude of the four effects.
Simulation results show that trade may decrease equilibrium participation. However, for a very elastic demand, simulation results indicate that equilibrium participation as well as absolute effectiveness may improve in medium range of N. It appears that more extensive simulation exercises would be worthwhile.
To the best of our knowledge, the current paper is the first to address a self-enforcing IEA in a scenario with an endogenous tariff setting. There are some limitations. First, it does not capture the technological difference between countries, thus leaving technology transfer unconsidered. Secondly, FDI and international production organization (outsourcing) are not included in the model. Both are expected to be elaborated in future modeling attempts to obtain deeper understanding of the impact of globalization on IEA.
Baomin Dong and Xin Zhao Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 16 (2009) [339] [340] [341] [342] [343] [344] [345] [346] [347] [348] [349] [350] [351] [352] [353] [354] [355] [356] entry effect only, the nonsignatories' marginal costs of abatement decrease, while the signatories' marginal costs of abatement increase. Condition (5) leads to the conclusion that when the leakage effect is present, the decrease of signatories' abatement is greater
